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As brokers and administrators of the AICPA Professional
Liability Insurance Program, Rollins Burdick Hunter,
through its subsidiary, RBH/Reid & Carr, Inc., has had
the opportunity to analyze the various factors that lead
to an accountant's getting sued.

We believe the article reprinted here is an excellent sum
mary of those factors and we want every firm that has
joined the Program to have a copy, in the hope that it
will help you avoid the common mistakes that can lead to
lawsuits.
The article is excerpted from a talk given by David B.
Isbell at a meeting of the San Francisco Chapter of the
California Society of Certified Public Accountants. He
practices law in Washington, D.C. and is a member of the
bars of the District of Columbia, Connecticut and the
SupremeCourtof the United States.

How to Get Sued
by David B. Isbell
RULE ONE.___________________________________
Choose clients who are about to go under and stick
with them.

It’s an obvious fact that most suits against accountants
follow some significant disaster to the client. Of course,
you cannot, as a practical matter, limit yourself to fat
cat clients. But what you can do, and what on a number
of occasions accountants realize afterwards that they
should have done, is to take special precautions when
your client is in trouble.

You can also do another thing, which is to disengage
when your client is in trouble. Let me mention, by way of
illustration, the Continental Vending case.1 I’m going to
refer to that case on several occasions in the course of
my talk, but I will not describe the case because I assume
that all of you are fully familiar with it. If you are not, you
ought to be. In the Continental Vending case, the ac
countants had withdrawn their opinion before the finan
cial statements of their clients were filed with the SEC in
connection with the 10-K. Had they withdrawn their
opinion a few days earlier, before Continental Vending’s
annual report to stockholders went out, almost certainly
there would not have been that case.
RULE TWO.___________________________________

When your client is in difficulty, let him cow you by
blaming you for delay in discovery of the problems,
by threatening loss of the account, by telling you
“we’re all in this together,” by threatening suit.
All sorts of suits are threatened in these circumstances:
suits for libel, suits for breach of contract, suits for some
unspecified harm that will befall the client unless you
stick with it. I won’t illustrate this rule by reference to any
specific reported case, but I will say that I know from
personal experience that all of these are very common
reactions of management of the client which has gotten
in trouble. “It’s all your fault,’’ they say, “and you’d better
not make it worse." I’m afraid that it occasionally hap
pens that accountants not only put up with this kind of
guff, but believe it. It sometimes happens that the ac
countant forgets, in this moment of stress, that his prin
cipal obligation as a professional is not to help the
'United States v. Simon, 425 F2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).

1

client, but to exercise his honest and independent judg
ment. It happens, too, that he forgets that if he goes
down the line with financial statements which fail to make
legally adequate disclosure, it’s not just the company and
its officers who are likely to be sued, but himself. It also
happens that the accountant considers that the loss of
the client is more serious than the possible losses that
would result from a suit brought against him.

RULE THREE._________________________________
Choose clients whose principals are not honest, and
take no extra precautions.

Here’s a rule that is easy to illustrate. The Continental
Vending case again pops to mind. The principal male
factor there was the principal stockholder and chief ex
ecutive officer of the company. It was he who diverted
funds from Continental Vending to an affiliated company,
which diversion of funds was the basis of the various
lawsuits involving Continental Vending. In the criminal
case, he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge and
testified against the accountant defendants.
The problem of crooked clients, and the hazards of crim
inal prosecution to which the auditors of such clients may
be exposed, have been vividly illustrated also in two re
cent highly publicized cases where accountants have
been convicted of criminal participation in their client’s
fraud: Equity Funding,2 and National Student Marketing.3
The rule is also well illustrated by another case which I
will refer to on several occasions in the course of the
talk and which I will tell you a little bit about, because
you probably have not had the opportunity to become as
familiar with it as you have the Continental Vending case.

This is the case of 1136 Tenants Corporation V. Max
Rothenberg & Co.,4 a case in the New York State courts
involving a suit by a cooperative apartment corporation
against accountants who did write-up work and prepared
unaudited financial statements and tax return informa
tion. The suit was based upon a failure by the account
ants to discover defalcations by the president of the
corporation’s managing agent. The trial court found for
the plaintiffs, and the case was taken to the Appellate
Division, the intermediate appellate court, where the
American Institute of CPAs, together with the New York
State Society of CPAs, filed an amicus curiae brief. That
court also held against the accountant defendants, and
appeal was taken to the New York Court of Appeals, the
highest court of New York, where again a joint amicus
curiae brief was submitted, but where the decision was
affirmed without opinion.
2United States v. Goldblum, Crim. No. 13390, U.S.D.C.C.D. Calif.
3United States v. Natelli, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 95, 250 (2d Cir.
1975).
4319 N.Y.S. 2d 1007 (App. Div. 1971).

The main issue in this case was the scope of the ac
countants’ engagement: the question was whether they
had been engaged to perform an audit, in which case
it was conceded that they should have discovered the
defalcations; or whether, as the accountants contend
ed, they had been engaged merely to do write-up work.
The trial court held against the defendants on that
issue, and that was the main holding. The Appellate
Division affirmed principally on that ground. The trial
court also used some unfortunately loose language
in its opinion which might be read to say that even if the
accountants had only been engaged for write-up work,
they nonetheless were under an obligation to perform
sufficient auditing procedures to discover defalcations.
It was that language in the lower court’s opinion that
principally gave rise to the Institute’s concern and led
to the submission of the amicus curiae brief. I’m glad to
say that although we did not win in the Appellate Divi
sion, nonetheless the decision of that court did not ap
pear to perpetuate this language of the lower court.
While the appellate court’s decision may have rested in
part on the same misconception of what an account
ant’s obligations are, it does not appear to me to be as
dangerous a case for precedental purposes as the lower
court decision.

To return to Rule Three, after that little detour to de
scribe the 1136 Tenants case, the point I want to make
by way of illustrating the rule concerns the president of
the managing agent of the cooperative corporation. This
fellow was an embezzler: his defalcations were the
ones that the accountants had failed to discover and
report to their client. He was the one who originally
retained the accountants for the cooperative apartment
corporation and he testified, believe it or not, that he
had retained them to do an audit—which of course,
had they performed it, would have uncovered his de
falcations. That testimony, alas, was credited in sub
stantial part by the court.
Still another case — one that, at this writing, is before
the United States Supreme Court — should be men
tioned under this rule: the case of Hochfelder v. Ernst &
Ernst.5 There the auditors were held subject to liability
as aiders and abettors of a fraud committed by the
president of their client, because they might be found
negligent in failing to discover it in the course of their
audit.

What should you do if you think principals or key agents
of the clients are crooked? You needn’t quit, although
as pointed out in connection with an earlier rule, you
are not necessarily prevented from doing so. What you
can, and indeed must, do, is to exercise extra care.
5Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 421 U.S. 909(1975).
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RULE FOUR.__________________________________
When trouble develops, keep your own counsel;
don’t consult your colleagues; and never consult an
attorney.

I can illustrate this rule again by reference to the Con
tinental Vending case, where the failure of consultation
had a particularly poignant twist to it. The Court of
Appeals in that case, in affirming the judgment of con
viction of the lower court, pointed out that there was
evidence that suggested that the defendants had, in the
course of the Continental Vending audit, failed to con
sult a partner in their firm with whom there was an
established procedure that he was to be consulted
about problem audits. There are two points to be made
about this. One is that it is possible, at least, that had
they consulted this partner, they would not have found
themselves in the position that they ultimately did, with
financial statements that included a crucial footnote
which they themselves admitted was susceptible of
serious misinterpretation. And indeed, in this light, as
you doubtless know, the firm involved has, since the
Continental Vending decision, adopted a policy requir
ing in every audit where a report is to be publicly is
sued, that before the report is issued it be given a
“cold” look by a partner wholly unassociated with the
audit. A very good policy.
The other point—the additional twist about the Con
tinental Vending case—is that the Court of Appeals
pointed to this evidence that the defendants had not
consulted with the partner with whom normally they
should have consulted, as evidence from which the jury
could infer a deliberate intent to defraud.

I’d like to address myself now to the other aspect of
this rule: the suggestion that if is a good idea to consult
attorneys when you have a problem that may have legal
ramifications. I’m clear that this is all too seldom done.
I'm also clear that it can be helpful, even if the attorney
cannot bring great expertise to bear—and relatively few
attorneys can, because relatively few attorneys have
been consulted by accountants, or have had other oc
casions to become familiar with problems of account
ancy from the point of view of the practitioner of ac
countancy. It can be useful, nonetheless, even if the
attorney does not have that extra expertise. It can be
useful to get even a layman’s view, particularly shar
pened with the perspective that attorneys presumably
have, of what a friendly neighborhood judge or jury—
who after all, are also laymen—might think about the
transaction in question.
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I have seen several times the quite extraordinary pic
ture of a company in trouble negotiating with the ac
countants about some matter, the company being rep
resented up one side of the table and down the other by
counsel. Typically, there will be outside counsel and
perhaps in-house counsel as well; there may be a direc
tor who also happens to be a lawyer; if it’s an SEC
problem, there may be special SEC counsel. Now it’s
the company versus the accountant. The company is
saying no, we don’t have to make this kind of dis
closure, we don’t want you to make that kind of dis
closure, it will put the company in terrible trouble—
bringing pressure upon the accountant, invoking legal
expertise as to whether or not disclosure is required.
And the accountant is sitting by himself, perhaps with a
colleague, but without legal advice, making a decision
about which his neck is in the noose, and which is often
basically a legal decision. If it’s a matter of adequacy of
disclosure with respect to an SEC filing, for example, it
is likely to be basically a legal decision.

In sum, I urge you to turn the rule upside down when
there is possible trouble: consult a colleague who can
bring an independent judgment to bear. Consult an
attorney.
RULE FIVE.__________________________________
Leave your engagement in oral form, and as vague
as possible.
The 1136 Tenants Corporation case is a perfect illus
tration of this rule. As I mentioned, the key issue in that
case was the scope of the engagement: whether it was
an engagement for an audit or only to prepare un
audited financial statements. There was no engagement
letter—and I’m sure that is still true in the majority of
instances where unaudited financials are called for. It
was really quite clear, I believe, to the eyes of an ac
countant or of someone who has had some experience
of such matters, that the financial statements which
were submitted to the client by the accountant were
unaudited financial statements. You might think that the
actual performance by the accountant of his engage
ment, as represented by his submission of these finan
cial statements, would be persuasive evidence of what
the accountant had been engaged to do. There was,
however, no explicit evidence in the form of a letter of
engagement. The plaintiffs were able to put in their
evidence about the scope of the engagement—part of
that evidence, as I have indicated, being testimony by
the embezzler himself that he had retained the account
ants to perform an audit. The problem of that case
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could have well been avoided by an engagement letter,
which might have effectively removed the issue of the
scope of the engagement from the matters to be
disputed in trial.
RULE SIX.

Pay no attention to Statements on Auditing Stand
ards and Pronouncements of the APB and FASB.
Because I have been thinking about the 1136 Tenants
Corporation case, I suppose I’m particularly conscious
of Statement on Auditing Procedure 38 (now SAS 1,
§516) with regard to unaudited financial statements.
That statement was not in effect at the time of the
events concerned in the case, but I’m afraid that the
practices that were reflected in that case do continue
to this day despite the fact that a statement has been
issued which prescribes exactly what should be done
with regard to unaudited statements. I’m afraid it still
occurs that there are financial statements prepared that
do not carry the legend “unaudited” or do not carry a
disclaimer—as was true of the financial statements in
this case. In this case the only identification was a
legend carried on each page of the financial state
ments, saying “subject to comments in accompanying
letter,” and the letter did not contain a disclaimer as
such, but only, “no independent verifications were
undertaken thereon.”
The use of that slightly odd phrase just quoted gave rise
to another area of dispute. The plaintiff produced an
expert witness who testified that “independent verifica
tion” has a special meaning in auditing, referring to
those audit steps that involve confirmation outside the
client; so that the phrase “no independent verifications
were undertaken” would carry the negative implication
that other kinds of verification were undertaken. The use
of this variant language, with the peculiar interpreta
tion to which it was susceptible, was of some impor
tance in the case because the audit steps that would
have been necessary to detect the defalcations were
steps involving work only on the client’s records and did
not require any confirmation with outside parties.

RULE SEVEN._________________________________

Make representations freely.
In illustration of this rule, I would like to refer to another
case involving unaudited financial statements, a case
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called Ryan v. Kanne6 which was decided in 1969 by the
Supreme Court of Iowa. Here again, the accountants
had prepared unaudited financial statements. In this
case they were adequately marked as unaudited and
they carried a disclaimer, and there was no question
but that they were unaudited financials. However, the
accountants in an accompanying letter stated, “We
have confirmed payables-trade.” The accountants also
orally made representations that the payables-trade
were correct within $5,000. Now, in fact, the accoun
tants had not adequately confirmed the payables, which
were understated by $49,000; and the accountants
wound up paying a good part of the understatement.
This occurred not because the court did not recognize
that they were unaudited statements but because the
accountants had made an affirmative representation
that they had confirmed the payables-trade, and the
payables-trade were a crucial item. (The court did make
a $5,000 allowance for the margin of error that the ac
countants had mentioned in their oral representation.)

RULE EIGHT._________________________________
Use technical terms in a loose and carefree fashion.

This is really a sub-rule of the one just stated. It is sug
gested, however, in a particularly impressive manner by
the 1136 Tenants Corporation case. In this case, surely
the critical evidence with regard to the scope of the en
gagement, from the veiwpoint of the court that tried the
case, was use of a term on some schedules which
were attached to these unaudited financial statements.
The schedules included one for accrued expenses
payable; and that schedule listed the amount of the ac
countants' fees that were accrued and unpaid. It
identified those accounting fees by the word “audit."
I’ll bet there’s more than one person in this room whose
firm still uses the word “audit" simply as a convenient
way of describing accounting services, regardless of
whether they really involve an audit or are merely write
up work or preparation of unaudited financials. Well,
I assert to you that any judge or jury would be likely
to be enormously impressed by the fact that an ac
countant who was claiming that he had only done write
up work and not an audit, had nonetheless represented
that his client owed him for “audit” services. The
amount of the item in this case was $600 in one year,
which was the full year’s fee; and in the other year
was only $150.
6170 N.W. 2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
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RULE NINE.__________________________________
Be casual about the way you perform your profes
sional work generally.
This, of course, should be Rule One, for an accountant
is legally obliged to perform his work with due profes
sional care and competence. He is not subject to liabil
ity unless he fails to do so. As you know, there is a legal
distinction of great importance between care on the one
hand, and honesty on the other—want of care being
negligence and want of honesty being fraud. This dis
tinction is significant because it governs the circle of
those who can sue the accountant for a breach of his
obligation. The accountant is, as a general matter, liable
for negligence only to the client, except in connection
with offerings of securities registered under the Securi
ties Act of 1933, where he is liable for negligence to all
purchasers. He’s also liable to third parties, such as
creditors and stock purchasers, who fall within the pri
mary benefit rule: that is, those whose use of the infor
mation which he furnishes is, to quote a phrase of
Cardozo’s, “the very end and aim of the transaction.’’
To those persons the accountant has liability for negli
gence. To other third parties, who include the vast
majority of those who may use the financial statements
with which he is associated or on which he has issued
his opinion, his liability is only for fraud.

What I’ve just said describes the law as it was yester
day and not necessarily as it may be tomorrow, but for
the moment I believe that what Judge Cardozo in the
Ultramares7 case called the “citadel of privity,” is still
holding out—though it is still, as it was then, under
attack.

In any event, all of this is really irrelevant in practical
terms for you as practitioners because there is no point
in trying to make a distinction between honesty and
care in order to limit your liability. You must be honest
in any event, and you cannot very well exercise care
with regard to part of an engagement and not with re
gard to another part of the engagement. You simply
have to be careful about everything and at all times. Let
me just add a footnote here, which is that you’ve got an
obligation of due care not only with regard to audit
work but also with regard to the preparation of un
audited financial statements. What you have to do to
discharge your duty of care is, of course, markedly dif
ferent as between unaudited financials and audited
ones, but the legal standard to which what you do do is
held, at least as a verbal matter, is the same.

7Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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RULE TEN.
Always sue for unpaid fees.
This is a very fine way of getting into trouble. I have
mentioned the case in Iowa, Ryan v. Kanne. That case
arose because the accountants had unpaid fees of
$3,434.67, and brought suit to recover their fees. They
were in fact awarded their fees, but they also got to
pay a counterclaim for $23,000.

I'm not saying that you should never, under any cir
cumstances, sue; I’m only saying that it is a hazardous
course. A much better course, I suggest, is periodic
payment as the work progresses. Keep your client paid
up.

Now those are my ten rules on how to get sued. There
is, however, another practical suggestion that ought to
be tossed in here. It has to do with saving money. Let’s
call it Rule Eleven. It is: Don't bother with liability in
surance; or if you do, keep it to a minimum. You may
save several hundred dollars a year in this fashion. Of
course, you may also, like the defendants in the 1136
Tenants Corporation case, get socked with a judgment
for $236,000 on an engagement where your fee was
$600 a year. (Incidentally, the accountants in that case
also recovered their unpaid fees of $1,000.) Or if a suit
is brought on a 1933 Act offering where you had certi
fied the financials, you may get sued for the entire
amount of the offering.

None of this, of course, will happen to you—unless you
forget about one of the other ten rules.

